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This thesis is an assessment of concerns expressed by
government sources regarding the extent and the impact of
current shipbuilding contract escalation coverage. The
review encompasses the evolution of the current coverage and
provides an examination of; how and why it has come about,
the complexity of the escalation clause, the extent of
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The analysis emphasizes the change in the Navy's
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I. INTRODUCTION AND 3ACKGR0UND
A. BACKGROUND
Discussion with officials involved in the United States
Navy (Navy) ship acquisition process at the systems command
level disclosed concern over current contract escalation
clauses. The concern was due specifically to the extent of
coverage and with the complexity of the clause. It was
suggested, by systems command personnel, that an objective
assessment of the current escalation coverage be performed.
The author's research indicated that the evolution of
ship acquisition contractual arrangements and the clauses
contained within have been influenced to a large degree by
the environment involved. It became evident to the author
during the research process that the thrae most influential
factors within that environment are, the complex design and
construction process, political forces and the requirement
to build all ships in commercial shipyards.
The author's research indicated that construction of
Navy ships is a long term undertaking which can take
anywhere from three to seven years depending on the size of
the ship and the complexity of design. The complexity
involved becomes apparent when the requirement itself is
examined. The ships in question must be able to accomodate
some of the most sophisticated weapon systems developed to
date. They must be able to operate for sustained periods of
time under either conventional or nuclear power. The sheer
size and operaitonal requirement for some ships provides
some indication of the complexity entailed.

The modern aircraft carrier has to be able to operate at
high speeds, launch and recover the most sophisticated
combatant aircraft in existence and provide suitable living
and working accomodations for up to six thousand people.
Another example of size as an indication of the complexity
of the requirement is the modern fleet ballistic missile
submarines. These submarines are almost as long as two
football fields, as wide as a z ity bus is long and are able
to carry and launch 24 long range missiles -hat weigh up to
63 tens each.
The long term nature and complexity involved in
shipbuilding are discussed because they are determinants of
risk which directly influences contract type and contract
provisions. Another input to the contract risk involved is
the fact that ship design is by its very nature subject to
continual change.
The author's research indicated that the acquisition of
ships involves political ramifications because required
funding has to come about as a result of congressional
legislation. It was learned that the high cost of ships is
reason for continuous debate and concern over methods of
acquiring them and requires extensive justification on the
part of the Navy. A review of the United States (U.S.)
Congressional record indicated that the Congress as guardian
of public funds is normally not in favor of open ended cost-
type shipbuilding contracts. Another very important reason
for political interest is the number of jobs that can be
provided to a particular geographical area. A major
shipbuilder in the U.S. can employ thousands of workers.
This can afford shipbuilders a sound political base from
which to influence Navy contracts. Dther aspects of the
political/congressional process that have a significant

impact on contractual arrangements with the shipbuilders are
the socioeconomic requirements mandated by federal law.
These requirements are very often implemented by means of
Government contracts.
The initial research efforts found that the third factor
that has influenced contractual arrangements is the lack of
alternative construction facilities. Regarding the
construction of Navy ships, the accepted practice is that it
be performed in commercial shipyards. Because of this the
Navy has allowed its inhouse capability to design and build
ships to deteriorate causing the Government to have limited
flexibility in cases where there are disagreements with
shipbuilders over contract costs, delivery schedules,
specifications or clauses. This situation can be a
difficult one for the Navy especially when the goals and the
requirements cf the parties are considered. The author's
research indicates that the Navy is constantly constrained
by the urgency of acquiring ships to provide for the defense
of the country. The major shipbuilders on the other hand
are not so constrained and are concerned primarily with cash
flow and profits.
Another difficult aspect of buying ships commercially is
that the Navy is required to obligate shipbuilding funds
appropriated by Congress in a timely fashion. Contractors
knowing this, can stretch out negotiations in , pursuit of
higher prices and more favorable contract provisions. It is
also important to note that the majority of the major
shipbuilder's business is with the Navy because commercial
ship construction has migrated to foreign yards. A
situation has resulted where the Navy and the shipbuilders
have little alternative but to deal with each other. It is
the author's opinion that due to ths urgency of the

requirement and the largeness of the business entities
involved in shipbuilding the Navy is at a disadvantage in
the acquisition process and must make contractual
concessions to acquire ships.
This brief discussion of the important factors that
influence the ship acquisition process is necessary prior to
an evaluation of the use of a current contract provision
such as the Escalation clause. As stated before the reason
is that these factors influence the kind of contractual
arrangement the Navy must enter into with private
shipbuilders to acquire ships. The arrangement is the
result of the contract type and the terms and conditions
that make up the contract. Prior to a discussion of a
particualr provision contained in shipbuilding contracts
such as the escalation clause, it is also necessary to
understand the type of contract in use toiay.
There are two basic contract types used for the
acquisition of ships by the Navy. They are the fixed price
type and the cost type. The major difference between these
two types of contracts is the allocation of cost risk to the
parties to the contract. The fixed price type of contract
provides for the assumption of the majority of the cost risk
by the contractor whereby the cost type contract allocates
the assumption of the majority of the risk to the
Government. A study prepared by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy [Ref. 1 ] indicates that most shipbuilders would
favor a cost type contract when there is a high degree of
risk involved.
There is some merit associated with this considering the
risks associated with Navy shipbuilding due to length of
construction, complexity of design which is subject to
constant change and the existence of federally mandated
10

requirements. The Navy on the other hand has generally
advocated the use of the fixed price type of contract to
acquire ships. There is merit to this argument which
emphasizes keeping costs down, providing incentive for
effective management, incenti vizing timely delivery and
aiding in the process of budgeting and managing appropriated
funds. Arguments for either position can be convincing and
therein lies a problem of devising a contractual arrangement
to accomodate the desires and needs of both the shipbuilder
and the Navy. Interviews with Navy headquarters personnel
indicated that ships acquired by the Navy are being built
under a fixed price type contract. There are some ships,
however, being built under cost type contracts. These are
normally the first ship of a new class because it is
considered more equitable for the shipbuilders given the
complexities and unknowns affiliated with a new class of
ships. This is significant in that it is an indication of a
shift in thinking regarding the allocation of cost risk
under Navy shipbuilding contracts. The cost type contract
allows the shipbuilder to shift almost all the cost risk
associated with ship construction to the Government. This
kind of contracting is at the opposite end of the risk
spectrum from the Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract. It was
determined through interviews with systems command personnel
that at one time the FFP contract was considered the most
effecient and effective way to buy ships.
Contracts used for the acquisition of ships other than
the leadship of the class are of the fixed price type and
are called Fixed Price Incentive Fee With Economic Price
Adjustment contracts (FPI/Escala tion) . Appendix A was taken
from the DOD Incentive Contracting Guide, [Ref. 2] and
provides a brief discussion of this type contract. The
development of this form of fixed price contracts is
11

significant because it has allowed the Navy to acquire ships
and at the same time accomodate the demands of concerned
Navy personnel, the congress and the shipbuilders.
The FPI/Escalation contract has allowed the Navy to
satisfy elements within its organization that have shown
extreme concern over the use of cost type contracts. The
FPI/Escalaticn contract is also advantageous politically in
that it keeps the Navy from having to tell the taxpayer and
the Congress that very costly items are being bought from
industry under cost type arrangements. This kind of
contract is advantageous to shipbuilders because it shifts
much of the cost risk associated with the length of
construction and the complexity of design to the
Government
.
The significance of this contractual arrangement is that
although it is of the fixed price variety it represents a
substantial shift toward risk sharing features of a cost
type arrangement. The specific features of this contractual
arrangement are the escalation clause, the incentive sharing
provisions and the ceiling price provision. These
provisions have evolved in some cases to the point where the
contract has literally become oost type in nature. It is
necessary to have some understanding of contract type
because the author's research indicates that it has had an
influence on the development of the current escalation
clause.
B. CBJECTIVE/SCOPE
It is the objective of this thesis to depict how and why
the current method of escalation coverage has come about,
why the clause is so complex , if the clause provides
excessive coverage and if the clause is having an adverse
12

impact on the shipbuilding process. It is intended that an
assessment of this type will allow those involved in the
acquisition process an opportunity to make a determination
of future action concerning shipbuilding contract escalation
provisions.
The scope of the thesis will be to demonstrate the
escalation clause in the ship acquisition environment,
describe shipbuilding contracts and the evolution and
provide an analysis of current escalation provisions.
Particular emphasis is placed on the transition from a fixed
expenditure phasing type escalation clause to an actual
expenditure phasing type clause.
The paper is not an attempt to show that either the
shipbuilder or the Navy is right or wrong regarding
contractual arrangements and particularly the escalation
clause. It is an attempt to provide the opportunity to look
objectively at shipbuilding contract escalation coverage.
In reviewing the current shipbuilding escalation provisions
it is necessary to understand that it is the product of an
ongoing process that has been in progress since the pre
World War II period. The author has salected the period
from 196 2 until the present as the period of significance.
It is also necessary to keep in mind that the current
escalation prevision is the result of the efforts of two
very large and powerful entities , namely the United States
Government (Government) and the corporate organizations that
own the shipbuilder.
C. METHODOLOGY
The approach to the problem will be one utilizing
content analysis, informal interviews, a literature search
and personal experience. The interviews were conducted with
13

individuals at the Navy headquarters level and field
activities who were knowledgeable in the Navy ship
acquisition process. The individuals include those working
with major ship acquisition programs, contracting personnel
and Department of Defense (DOD) auditors. The author's
experience includes assignments with two major shipbuilding
acquisiton programs and with the claims group established by
the Navy in 1976 to aid in settling major shipbuilding
claims.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The first chapter provides information concerning the
environment that influences the acquisition process. It
also provides some background information concerning the
contractual arrangements with lajor shipbuilders. It is
intended that the results of research in these two areas
will provide the basis for determining how and why the
current escalation clause has evolved to what it is today.
Chapter II will explain the purpose of escalation
clauses. It will provide some understanding of the basic
operation of escalation clauses used in contracts for Navy
ships. Prior to going to Chapter III and reviewing
developments in escalation coverage over the recent past
(1962 - 1982) some historical background will be provided.
This chapter is intended to help the reader understand how
these clauses started, what their purpose is and hew they
operate.
Chapter III will provide an in depth review and
comparison of the significant changes in escalation coverage
over the past 20 years. It was during this period that a
drastic change in the way the Navy provided escalation
coverage came about, and that the concept of reimbursing the
1U

contractor for almost all of the effects of inflation was to
occur. It is intended that the research sffort in this area
will answer questions pertaining to the increase in
coraplexi-y and the amount of coverage provided. The effort
will also provide more of the answer to the question of how
and why -he current clause got to be as it is today.
Chapter IV will analyze the effects of the transition
from the 1962 escalation clause to the 1975 clause. The
analysis will determine the iesireable and undesireable
effects of the transition.
Chap-er V will provide a summary and conclusion of the
research and analysis. The author will provide




II. SHIPBUILDING ES CALATION CLAUSES
A. INTRODUCTION
Prior to an analysis of the current shipbuilding
escalation clause it is necessary to have a general
understanding of the purpose of escalation clauses, how they
operate and their historical development. The historical
aspect of Chapter II will be up through the development of
the Navy*s 1975 Standard Escalation clause. Chapter III
will analyze the developments in escalation coverage from
1962 through the present.
B. PURPOSE OF CLAUSES
The term "escalation" is used here to describe the post
contract award cost increases incurred as a result of higher
labor and material costs in the shipbuilding industry.
Stated another way, the term is used to describe the impact
of inflation on contract costs during the period of ship
construction.
Escalation provisions are included in shipbuilding
contracts for Navy ships to alleviate the effects of
inflation on the contractor's labor and material costs. The
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) [ Ref . 3], indicates
that there may be Economic Price Adjustments to fixed-price
type contracts, "when the contracting officer determines
that price adjustment provisions are necessary. .. to protect
the contractor and the Government against significant
economic fluctuations in labor or material costs. .."[ Ref
.
3]. The Navy currently uses a Cost Index Method of
providing escalation coverage which, according to the DAR,
16

is "designed to minimize contingency pricing", and is
recommended when:
1 There will be an extended period of performance with
significant costs to be incurred beyond one year after
commencement of contract perofrmance.
2. The contract amount subject to adjustment is
substantial.
3. The economic variables for labor and material are
determined to be too unstable to reflect a reasonable
division of risk between the parties absent economic
price adjustment provisions .[ Ref . 3]
Escalation provisions are only applicable to fixed-price
type contracts. Cost type contracts do not require
escalation coverage due to the fact that the Government
assumes the majority of the cost risk and is commmitted to
reimbursing a contractor for all allowable and allocable
costs. Support for the current use of the Cost Index Method
of economic price adjustment is that it is thought to
minimize contingency pricing by requiring shipbuilders to
submit their price proposals in Base Month dollars. Under
this kind of clause, payments of the basic contract cost
(basic Costs) are made periodically, are based on physical
progress with an adjustable billing base, and are calculated
in Ease Month dollars. The payment of escalation is
calculated separately on the basis of an agreed to index and
on the actual incurred costs.
The intent of the escalation provisions currently used
in Navy shipbuilding contracts is to consider the long term
aspects and complexity involved in the process, to remain
within the DAR provisions, but accomodate the shipbuilding
process and provide an arrangement whereby the shipbuilder
is approximately compensated for inflationary effects. The
author's research indicates that the mechanics of this kind
of clause are intended to recognize the fact that the
shipbuilder maintains some control over the degree to which
his costs are affected by inflation.
17

C. OPERATION OF CLAUSES
The operation of the Cost Index Method of economic price
adjustment currently used in Navy shipbuilding contracts
requires a labor and material index. The material index
used is termed the Material Index for Steel Vessel
Contracts. It is made up of the elementary Bureau of Labor
Statistics material indexes for Iron and Steel, General
Purpose Machinery and Electrical Machinery and Equipment
[Ref. 4], This material index has been criticized because
it does not include inputs for many of the other materials
that go into the construction of a ship. The author's
research effort indicated that the advantage of this index
is its simplicity in that the use of a few elements that are
very familiar to the shipbuilding industry provides for
increased predictability which is of primary importance in
the pricing of long term shipbuilding contracts. Increased
predictability is significant in that shipbuilders generally
approach pricing by fully forward pricing the anticipated
contract and subtracting out an estimate of escalation to be
recovered under the escalation clause. The more predictable
the estimate of escalation the less opportunity there is for
overpricing or underpricing the contract.
The labor index used to facilitate current shipbuilding
escalation provisions is the Index of Average Hourly
Earnings for Steel Vessel Contracts. This index is
claculated for the Navy by tha Bureau of Labor Statistics
and published monthly. It is based on labor data inputs of
straight -time hourly wages from 17 private shipyards. This
input is voluntarily submitted and does not include shift
differentials, overtime premiums, or holiday premiums.
First-line supervisory wages are reported as direct labor.
18

The escalation payment calculation (greatly simplified)
for a monthly period under current Navy shipbuilding
contract provisions is as shown in Exhibit II- 1. It was
taker, from NAVSEA data.
MONTHLY CHANGE CONTRACTOR'S




There can be some variation in this calculation depending on
the desire to arrive initially at either the escalation
costs or the base contract costs
.
The escalation calculation is intended to be carried oa;
in three operations, treating direct labor costs, material
costs and indirect costs separately due to differences in
applicalble index and/or fraction of costs covered by the
escalation provisions. Monthly escalation payments,
calculated as noted, are paid throughout the life of the
contract subject to delivery constrained limiting dates and
to limiting dollar amounts. Escalation payments are not
made on incurred costs which exceed the contract ceiling
price identified in the incentive sharing agreement. The
current escalation provisions provide for frequent
reimbursement of cost increases incurred as long as they are
within the agreed upon dollar limits. The provisions also
provide for payment of escalation outside the contract
incentive pricing arrangement. By means of the Payments
clause, payment of the basic contract price is made on a
percentage of completion basis.
19

In summary the escalation clause is to protect the
Government and shipbuilder against economic fluctuations and
to eliminate contingency pricing. The operation of current
clauses are based on labor and material indices derived from
BLS data applied to shipbuilders costs to determine his
increase or decrease in expected costs due to inflation.
This is an overview of current escalation provisions. A
more in depth analysis will be provided in chapter II under
the heading cf the 1975 standard clause.
D. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The escalation clause that is currently being used in
major Navy shipbuilding contracts has its basis in the fact
that escalation payments are computed using the contractor's
actual incurred costs. It is the result of a clause that
was devised in 1975 by the Navy which has undergone constant
revision. The author's research indicates that this
revision has been as a result of the demands of
shipbuilders, and in keeping with the Navy's apparent policy
of in fact relieving the shipbuilders of as much of the
business risk of inflation during ship construction as is
possible.
There is one other primary shipbuilding contract
escalation clause that has been used by the Navy during the
pericd of the last 20 years which is the Fixed Curve Clause
devised in 1962. The operation of this clause is based on
the premise of a fixed baseline in terms of cost subject to
escalation and the time phasing of those costs.
It is interesting to note that the Fixed Curve clause
was developed during a period when the Navy was buying ships
on a Fixed-Price basis. After the Navy determined that it
was more prudent to institute a new concept of contracting
20

for ships in the form of Fixed Price Incentive (FPI)
contracts, it became necessary to eventually modify the 1962
escalation clause. FPI contracting for ship construction
came into being in the 196 0s and was viewed as a less rigid
form with a shifting of the assumption of some cost risk
from the shipbuilder to the Government. The Fixed Curve
escalation clause (1962) continued to be used in FPI
contracts until 1975 when the Actual Cost clause (1975) was
developed. This clause was definitely less rigid than the
1962 clause and very much in keeping with the shifting of
risk concept embodied in the FPI contract. Research
indicates that this occurred as a result of factors such as
product complexity and business pressure.
A literature search conducted by the author revealed
that escalation provisions currently used in shipbuilding
contracts are a by-product of certain types of price
redetermination provisions that were used prior to World War
II. "Price redetermination" provisions were normally used
in contracts where the Government might have reason to think
that the contractors proposed price was unreasonably high
and wanted to make provision for downward repricing based on
contractor submitted cost data for partial completion of the
contract
.
It was during the 1939-194 1 time frame that the Navy
began using escalation clauses in all of its contracts to
deal with the increasing problem of inflation. The initial
kind was a labor and material index clause. This type of
clause provided for a percentage of changes in specified
labor and material indices to be applied to a contractor's
actual expenditures. This approach to escalation recovery
is conceptually very similar to current shipbuilding
escalation provisions whereby recovery is based on actual
21

incurred costs. The literature on this subject indicates
that there was concern over the use of the actual
expenditure basis of escalation recovery in that it was
allowing an increase of costs on an increase already
contained in the contractor's actual expenditures.
After World War II the Navy devised two escalation
clauses in an attempt to accomodate contractor's demands for
protection against rising costs. One clause was for labor,
and upon completion of the contract provided for a one time
escalation of direct labor, based on agreed estimates of
average hourly wage rates and total hours of labor. The
other clause dealt with material escalation costs in the
same manner, on the basis of agreed to estimates of
quantities and prices of raw materials. In both clauses the
price adjustment was constrained by a fixed dollar ceiling.
These clauses were eventually modified to provide for
downward as well as upward price adjustment which is still a
viable concept in current shipbuilding escalation
provisions.
In 1956 the Navy began using a somewhat different
approach to escalation coverage in shipbuilding contracts.
A new clause was devised which provided for a dollar for
dollar reimbursement on subcontracts and a material index
for use in escalation recovery on raw materials cost. A
regional labor index was used in determining escalation
recovery on direct and indirect costs. In 1959 this clause
was revised to use a material index developed by the Navy
and the Maritime Administration for all escalation recovery
on all material costs, eliminating the pass thru
reimbursement type coverage for subcontract costs.
In 1962, a standard shipbuilding contract escalation
clause was devised by the Navy. The regional labor index
22

used in the 1959 clause was replaced with a national labor
index that was originally based on the average straight time
hourly earnings of twenty-one selected shipyards. The
material index remained the same as that used in the 1959
clause. The last major conceptual change in shipbuilding
escalation clauses was in 1975 when the Navy developed the
Actual Cost clause. To data, the significant changes
regarding the use of this clause have been in the area of
using separate indices for escalation coverage of certain
costs, direct pass through escalation coverage for
government caused increases, and improved escalation
coverage past the contract delivery date until the actual
delivery date.
It is interesting to note that the concept of escalation
recovery in the form of direct pass throughs, appears to
have some precedent in the early years of escalation clause
development. The author's literature search indicates that
it was referred to as automatic coverage by the Government,
for Government actions that caused labor cost increases that
in turn resulted in contract cost increases. This kind of
coverage was a result of actions taken by the Office of
Price Administration regarding the establishment of maximum
prices and actions taken by the War Labor Board that caused
increases in labor costs. In July of 19T4 a clause commonly
referred to as the "Forrestall" clause was incorporated into
Navy contracts to eliminate some of the risk associated with
U.S. Government actions that caused price increases. Under
this clause the contractor had to warrant that its contract
price did not contain any contingency allowances for wage
and salary increases or adjustments in other terms and
conditions of employment. The clause also said that in the
case where the contractor was ordered by a "duly authorized
agency of the federal government" [Ref. 5 ] to make such
23

changes in its wages, salaries, or other terms and
conditions of employ mnent as would substantially effect the
cost of performing the contract, the contract price would be
adjusted by mutual agreement.
E. SUMMARY
In summary, it is helpful to understand the apparent
origins of some of the current concepts of escalation
recovery that are in operation today when trying to evaluate
if their current use is in fact appropriate. The next
chapter will be an analysis of recent escalation coverage
used in shipbuilding contracts. It will look at only two
clauses and will cover the past 20 years of experience.
24

Ill' RECENT SHIPBUILDING ESCALATION CLAUSES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide an analysis of the Navy's
shipbuilding escalation coverage from 1962 through the
present. There will be two specific clauses involved namely
the Fixed Curve clause (1962) and the Actual Cost clause
(1975). The change from the 1962 clause to the 1975 clause
marks, in the author's opinion, a najor shift in the
philosophy concerning escalation coverage. The analysis
will aid in understanding why the Navy uses the current form
of coverage. It will also aid in understanding the kind and
extent of coverage in effect today to provide the basis for
an analysis of the possibility of excess coverage. This
chapter will also provide the basis for an analysis of the
complexity and adverse impact resulting from the use of the
current clause.
B. FIXED CURVE CLAUSE (1962)
1 . Backgro und
In 1962 the Department of Defense encouraged the use
of incentive contracts. Figures taken from D.F. Pace's text
[Ref. 6] for 1960 indicate that 13. U of all the Navy's
contracting was in the form of Fixed Price Incentive (FPI)
contracts. The remaining 86. 9 % was in the following
contract form:
Firm fixed price 31. 9
^
Fixed price redeterrainable 6.7*
Fixed price escalation 18.6*
Cost reimbursement type contracts 29.7%
25

During this period it appears from the statistics that the
Navy was frequently using a fixed-price contracting mode.
In the author's opinion the times were more
conducive then than today for the use of fixed-price
contracts in the acquisition of ships. There are two major
reascns for this. The first is the fact that in the past,
some ships for the Navy were being constructed in Government
yards, offering an alternative to use of private
shipbuilders. The second is -hat most shipyards had not yet
become owned by large corporations that would later prove to
have a strong influence of U.S. Government contract terms
and conditions. The author's research indicated another
factor that should be noted and that is that the economy was
not nearly so inflationary as it was to become in the 1970s.
In 1962 the Navy developed an escalation clause for
use in shipbuilding contracts commonly referred to as either
the 1962 Standard clause or the Fixed Curve clause. This
clause was developed to provide approximate protection to
both the Government and shipbuilder against zhe fluctuations
of labor and material costs that might occur between
contract bid and delivery, and were outside the control of
the contractor. The clause evolved from experience with the
shipbuilding industry by the Navy and the Maritime
Administration. The author determined by way of interviews
with Navy contracting officials that conceptually the
inception of this clause was influenced by the fixed-price
contracting that was predominantly used at the time. It is,
in effect a Firm Fixed-Price contract escalation clause, in
that it employs a fixed baseline in terms of costs subject




In the author's opinion the clause was not overly
long or complex, it was easy to administer and the only
unknown at the time of contract award was the Bureau of
Labor index changes that would occur over the course of the
contract as a result of changing material and labor costs.
A copy of this clause which was taken from a contract for a
Navy replenishment ship (AOR-1) is provided in Appendix B
for purposes of providing the reader the opportunity to
become familiar with the operation of the provisions.
Attention is directed specifically to paragraphs (b) and (c)
for guidance in computing escalation recovery caused by
changes in labor and material costs. Exhibit III-1 is
provided to further assist in understanding the method of
calculating the escalation payment due the shipbuilder under
this clause. Information derived from NAVSEA data. A sample
computation of labor escalation is provided in Appendix C.
3 . Features
To more fully understand the operation of the Fixed-
Curve escalation clause a summary, based on the author*s
perceptions, of the important features is provided.
a. The bureau of Labor Satistics (BLS) national shipbuilding
index is used as the labor index and a weighted composite
of three BLS wholesale price indices is used as the
material index. The labor index is based on data
supplied by 17 United States (U.S.) shipbuilders. The
weights used in the material index are: Iron and Steel -
45%, General Purpose Machinery and Equipment - 40 %, and
Electrical Machinery and Equipment - 15*.
b. The percentages of total costs, made up of labor,
material and overhead costs that were subject to
escalation are fixed or pre-set at contract award.
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AMOUNT (1) AMOUNT (2) CONTRACT COST (3)
ESCALATION = OF INDEX X SUBJECT TO X SUBJECT TO
CHANGE ESCALATION ESCALATION
(1) Amount of = Current Inde x - Reference In dex
index change Reference Index
(2) Amount subject = Pre-Set Expenditures per Quarter
to escalation
(3) Contract cost = Specified Percentage of Initial




c. The rates at which labor, material and overhead are to be
expended are fixed or pre-set at contract award.
d. The original target cost and the escalation multiplier do
not change over the course of the contract.
e. Costs that are incurred and due to contract changes are
net subject to escalation recovery.
f. Escalation payments are to be made quarterly or on
publication on the indices.
g. Escalation payments are to continue up to the contract
delivery date and no adjustment is to be made for early
or late delivery.
**• 1962 Clause Summary
Again it should be emphasized that the clause is not
long or complex and does not pose an unreasonable
administrative burden. There is only one unknown (BLS
28

indices changes) at contract award which, in the author's
opinion, is an aid to administration and to the budget
process for escalation funding. The indices used are of a
national nature and encourage the contractor to control
labor and material costs. The clause can aid in
incentiv izing a shipbuilder to deliver as close to contract
delivery as possible. Finally, it provides for change work
to be forward priced, allowing the Navy to know the full
cost of changes. In summary, the clause does not to any
degree reduce the incentives which the contractor would have
under a Firm Fixed-Price contract.
C. ACTUAL COST CLAUSE (1975)
1 . Background
During the period between the development of the
Fixed Curve clause (1962) and a new clause, developed in
1975, there was change regarding the type of contract used
for the acquisition of ships for the Navy. There was also
change taking place in the shipbuilding industry regarding
the ownership and management of the shipyards. It was also
during this period that inflation became severe.
D.F. Pace»s text, [Ref. 6], indicates that during
the 1960s the FPI contract became the prevalent type of
contract used for the acquisition of aajor shipbuilding
programs. Pace goes on to say that DO D emphasis on the
wider use of this contract form was in reaction to the
extensive use of the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract.
The Navy, on the other hand was moving from the opposite
direction in an attempt to find a less rigid arrangement
than the Firm Fixed Price contract it was using.
It was also during this period that the shipbuilding
industry was changing its personality. The ownership and
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management cf shipyards in the U.S. was changing from
independent shipyards to major corporate ownership. Such
entities as Litton Industries, Tenneco Incorporated, General
Dynamics Incorporated, Congoleum Corporation and Ogden
Corporation became the owners of such major shipyards as
Ingalls Shipyard, Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.,
Electric Boat Division, Bath Iron Works and Avondale
Shipyards, respectively. It is the author f s opinion that
with this kind of ownership came little shipbuilding
expertise and strong emphasis on the financial aspects of
the business, with profits being of great importance. This
approach to the business of building ships was in contrast
with the emphasis of the earlier independent shipyard
owners, when the actual ship construction was of prime
importance. Jacques S. Gansler, in his book The Defense
Industry . [Ref. 7], comments on this very issue as follows:
...many of the yards have recently baen taken oyer by
large conglomerates. These takeovers have had significant
positive and negative impacts on The overall industry.
Modern management techniques have been introduced, but the
fact that the new owners are oriented primarily toward
profits. whereas the earlier owners focused on
shipbuilding has contributed to the friction between the
industry and the Navy in the 1 970s.
It should be added that what these large corporate entities
lacked in the way of shipbuilding expertise, they made up
for in financial and legal ability. They were also most
adept at using the political arena to their advantage in
conducting business with the Government.
Background on shipbuilding business activity during
the period leading up to the development of the Actual Cost
clause is needed to be able to analyze the evolution toward
a new clause. It was learned through interviews with Navy
contracting personnel that during the 1960s there was a
major increase in Navy shipbuilding programs. This, in turn
had a large impact on the business base of the major
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shipbuilders, in that there was very little commercial
shipbuilding activity available in the U.S.. It was learned
that ths re was intense competition among the shipbuilders to
obtain the contracts for the new shipbuilding programs.
It is interesting to note that multi-million dollar
claims were to be submitted against the Navy by a number of
the major shipbuilders as a result of contracts awarded for
ships under these programs. In conjunction with these major
cost overruns there were numerous late deliveries. Talcing
into consideration the large number of contract changes that
are inherent in this kind of work, it is the author's
opinion that the cost of much of this work was under-
estimated, and the ability to acquire the numbers of skilled
workers to perform the work was over-estimated by the
shipbuilders. It is important for the reader to be aware of
this when trying to understand the evolution of shipbuilding
contract escalation provisions.
Most of the literature attributes the development of
the 1975 escalation clause to the need to alleviate the
rising costs of shipbuilding that were the direct result of
the "spiraling inflation" during the 1970s. Upon an
analysis of the 1962 and 1975 clause it is interesting to
note, however, that if the ships in question had been built
according to schedule and delivered according to the
contract (excluding the effect of change orders), the Fixed
Curve clause would have adequately reimbursed the
shipbuilders for the effects of inflation, for the BL5
indices were constantly changing to accomodate the rate of
inflation.
It is true that the inflationary trends that began
in the mid 1960s became severe in the early 1970s. The
spiraling inflation of this time did in fact contribute to
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the sense of urgency for a revised shipbuilding escalation
clause emanating from the discussions surrounding the
massive Navy shipbuilding claims at issue. There were
demands from the shipbuilding industry that something be
done about the economic instability that was contributing to
the higher than expected costs of building ships for the
Navy. The implications were that the 1962 clause was not
compatible with the FPI contract that had become the
accepted arrangement for acquiring modern warships.
In response to the situation, the Navy, in 1975
devised an escalation provision that was more in keeping
with the FPI contract and would accomodate the desires of
the shipbuilders. This clause was to be referred to as the
1975 Standard clause, the Marshall clause or the Actual Cost
clause. By means of interviews and a review of the
available literature it was determined that as was the case
with the 1962 clause, it was developed to provide protection
against labor and material cost fluctuations that might
occur during ship construction. It differed from the 1962
clause in that protection to be provided the contractor was
enhanced with the Government assuming more risk, the term of
coverage was to be more comprehensive and payment was to be
more frequent. Conceptually, it would be more in keeping
with the form of contracting whereby the emphasis is on the
Government providing assurance of cost recovery by the
shipbuilder. Again it should be noted that the FPI contract
had tecoae accepted as the only way to acquire ships, other
than in the case of the lead ship of a class.
2 . Operation
The 1975 clause in comparison with the 1962 clause
increased in length and complexity. It was determined by
means of interviews that it became aore of a burden
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administratively and the number of unknowns at contract
award increased, making the budgeting process more complex.
A copy of the Actual Cost (1975) clause taken from an FFG-7
Class contract is provided as Appendix D. Attention is
directed specifically to paragraph (c) for guidance in
computing escalation recovery caused by changes in labor and
material costs. Exhibit III-2 is provided to further assist
in understanding the method of calculating the escalation
payment due the shipbuilder under this clause. It was derived
from NAVSEA data. A sample escalation computation is
provided in Appendix E.
ACTUAL ACTUAL
ESCALATION = COST - COST X INDEX CHANGE(1)
INCURRED INCURRED




Again to more fully understand the operation of the
Actual Cost escalation clause a summary based on the
author's perceptions of the important features is provided.
a. Escalation is paid on the basis of the actual expenditure
phasing of costs, as they are incurred, rather than on
the basis of a pre-established and fixed phasing of
costs
.
b. Escalation is paid on the basis of allowable costs
incurred not to exceed ceiling price rather than on the
fixed basis of the initial target cost.
c. Change orders are included in the escalation coverage
vice being separately forward priced. Escalation
coverage is to continue through the actual delivery of
the ship being constructed or until the cumulative de-
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escalated costs reach ceiling price. The value of the
BIS indices would remain constant or decrease for periods
beyond the contract delivery date,
d. Escalation recovery is to be paid to the shipbuilder
mcnthly on a per ship basis instead of quarterly on a
contract basis as in the past.
**• 19 75 Clause Summary
Under the Actual Cost clause (1975) used in Navy
shipbuilding contract, escalation is defined as:
ESCAIATION = COSTS INCORR ED-BAS E COSTS
In essence this clause acts to de-escalate ACTUAL incurred
costs. The clause continues to provide coverage until the
ship delivers or up to the point where the incurred base
costs (COSTS INCURRED - ESCALATION COSTS) reaches the
ceiling price agreed to in the contract. This is a most
significant aspect of this clause in that it is essentially
reimbursing the shipbuilder for all of its costs up to
ceiling price. In cases where ceiling price is
significantly greater than the target cost involved,
considering the associated risk, the resulting arrangement
approaches a cost reimbursement type contract. This is in
contrast with the Fixed Curve clause where escalation was
computed on the basis of pre-set cost expenditure rates.
In the author's opinion based on experience, two
significant ramifications of this clause are that there is a
lessening of incentive for the shipbuilder to meet the
contract delivery date and there is less incentive to
perform the work in the most cost effective manner from the




The escalation clause that is being used in soma of the
most recently awarded contracts is a modified version of the
Actual Cost clause (1975) . The modifications have been the
result of an evolutionary process that has been in the
direction of shifting more of the cost risk to the
Government. It attempts to separately identify certain
costs more specifically than the categories of Material,
Labor and Indirect Costs used in the past and apply specific
indices to these costs for the purpose of determining
escalation recovery. Needless to say, this has added to the
number of variables involved which in turn has contributed
to added difficulty regarding the budgeting process and the
administration of the clause. An example of the current
clause which was taken from a recent Navy contract for
attack submarines is provided as Appendix ? for the reader
interested in the specifics of the provisions entailed. It
also provides some insight into the incraase in length and




(D) and ( E) of Appendix F provide a
detailed look at the extent of the separate escalation
coverage. A significant aspect of these provisions aside
from the extensive number of specific costs and indices
involved, are the pass through provisions. The computations
formula for escalation payments on employee benefits cost
increases and electricity and fuel oil cost increases
results in paying the shipbuilder for his actual costs.
Another change since the 1975 version of the current clause
is that the escalation coverage is to continue for 240 days
beyond the contract delivery date. After the 240 days until





It is the author's opinion based on the analysis that
the changes from the 1962 clause' to the 1975 clause was
significant in that escalation coverage changed from being
of a preset nature to being more of an actual reimbursement
type si-uation. Some of the contractor's incentive was
compromised by the change and there is a strong argument
based on the analysis that the large business entities
involved can influence contractual arrangments.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT COVERAGE
A. INTRODUCTION
The following discussion presents an analysis of the
fallcut or effects of the change from the Fixed Curve clause
(1962) to the Actual Cost clause (1975). The main effect
was the assumption by the Government of more cost risk which
in turn can adversely effect the intent of the Fixed Price
Incentive (FPI) contract type to perform as effectively and
effecien-ly as possible. There were other effects that will
be discussed such as lessening of delivery incentive,
increased difficulty in budgeting, increased administrative
effort, loss of contract change total cost visibility and
increased opportunity for wind fall profits.
B. TRANSITION FROM THE 1962 TO THE 1975 CLAUSE
The authors research indicates that the Actual Cost
clause (1975) was devised to more closely appoximate and
provide compensation for the actual impact on costs incurred
under the contract due to economic change. Research by the
authcr indicates that it was designed so that the clause
would continue to provide a positive incentive to
shipbuilders to meet contract delivery schedules. In
addition to the above the ultimate requirement of the
escalation clause continues to be to eliminate contingency
costs from the contract price with the Government and the
shipbuilder, sharing to some degree in the risk associated
with inflaiton in the economy. Experts interviewed
indicated the ultimate consequence of escalation coverage
should be to reduce the overall contract cost to the
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Government by not paying for costs that may never be
incurred. An analysis of the Fixed Curve clause (1962)
indicates that it exploits the fact that the shipbuilder has
control over the incurring of labor and material costs with
regard to quantity and timing. This control can result for
example, through the ordering of materials, negotiating
labor agreements and the development of construction
schedules.
The scheduling of work is usually referred to as the
phasing aspect of pricing and is critical to determining the
extent to which escalation costs will be incurred. From the
standpoint of overall cost to the Government, it is
advantageous to incurr costs as early in the contract as
possible because the normal course of the economy has been
in the direction of increasing prices. The 1962 clause
recognizes this and penalizes the shipbuilder (by means of
the fixed expenditure mechanism) that does not adhere to an
acceptable schedule but instead performs work in later, more
expensive time frames. When there is not any required
phasing of costs (as is the case under the 1975 clause)
there is not the same incentive to manage construction
scheduling so as to incurr the least amount of inflationary
cost to the Government. There is less incentive from the
standpoint of incurring increased escalation costs where
specific indices or direct pass through mechanisms are
involved which is the situation with current provisions. In
effect the Government is responsible for paying escalation
costs despite the time frame.
From the above discussion it would appear that there is
some contradiction regarding the accepted intention of the
1975 clause and the results to which its actual operation is
conducive. What in fact has happened is that the Government
38

has provided a contractual approach for acquiring ships that
is very similar to a cost reimbursement type contract. This
kind of a contractual arrangement is not conducive to
stimulating the most effecient and effective construction
process from the standpoint of the Government. The result
can be higher costs to the Navy as a result of a contract
clause that was devised to provide for cost savings under
the contract.
C. SPECIFIC ONDESIREABLE EFFECTS
The following analysis involves some of the specific
effects of the change from the 1962 to the 1975 clause. The
topics include delivery incentive, budgeting problems,
administrative burden, change visibility and windfall
profits.
!• Delivery I ncentive
The current escalation clause provides full coverage
out to 240 days after the contract delivery date. Upon
reaching the 240 day point escalation coverage continues
until actual delivery at the current index, but not to
exceed the index in effect at the post (240 day) deliver
date. This kind of arrangement does very little to
disccurage the shipbuilder from not meeting the delivery
date specified in the contract. Research indicated that the
escalation clause was not devised to be a delivery incentive
provision in shipbuilding contracts and that contract
delivery incentives should be provided separately. The
point to be made is that the current shipbuilding escalation
clause contains a delivery dis-i ncentivizing aspect that can




The author's research shows that negative delivery
incentive offers the shipbuilder business alternatives that
were not intended to be provided by the clause. The
opportunity to exploit the clause under a particular
contract for business purposes, can come about when there is
either more pressing work in the yard or very little other
work in the yard. When there is very little other work
available the shipbuilder can stretch out the contract work
in order to keep people employed and maintain skill levels
in anticipation of future work. The other situation arises
when there is more pressing work whereby the shipbuilder
stands to suffer financial loss should that work not be
completed as scheduled.
In the situation discussed above the business
decision that will, in the author 1 s opinion, most likely be
made will be to stretch out the delivery of the Navy work
because there is much less risk of adverse financial
consequences. This is a result of the current escalation
clause providing almost full coverage until actual delivery
depending on the extent of delay. For clarification
purposes the stretchout of the Navy contract delivery comes
about by the shipbuilder removing resources (manning,
industrial capability) from that contract and applying it to
more pressing contracts. The result is that the Government
can te placed in the position of subsidizing commercial work
without having any choice in the matter. The undesireable
effect again, is that because the work is performed in a
later time frame, it is more costly. Another more long
range effect is that late delivery of ships can adversely




The author's research showed that from a budgeting
standpoint the 1975 clause is more difficult than the 1962
clause. The event of the 197 5 clause introduced two new
variables that would impact funding/budgeting. These
variables are the changing base cost and the use of the
actual phasing of costs. The 1962 clause based escalation
computations on the initial target cost of the contract and
on a pre-set time phasing of when these costs were to be
incurred. The 1975 clause bases computations on incurred
costs (which are always increasing) and on the actual
phasing (of which the contractor has some controls) . These
two variables contained in the 1975 clause make it more
difficult for forcasting escalation costs for budgeting
purposes than under the 1962 clause containg less varialble
provisions. The budgeting issue is significant because it
is necessary for the Navy to have funding available for
projected escalation costs at the time of contract award.
If the Navy underestimates these costs it must return to
Congress for funding increases which can jeopardize
credability. On the other hand, should the costs be over
estimated, the Navy will have funds tied up unnecessarily
and not be serving a useful purpose.
3. Adminis trative B urden
By way of experience and through interviews it was
determined that from an administrative standpoint the 1975
clause has caused an increase in effort required to manage
escalation payment over that required of the 1962 clause.
The increased effort is a result of more variables including
those noted above as well as the increase in specific
indices that have to be applied to specific costs. The 1962
clause required computations for only two categories of
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cost, namely labor and material costs. The current edition
of the 1975 clause contains six separate categories of costs
for which individual computations are required. The more
categories of costs involved results in more specific cost
accumulations which require accounting and clerical work.
Increased administration effort occurs because of the sheer
complexity and length of the clause in that it requires more
time and effort on the part of those involved to merely
understand it. This aspect impacts those involved in
negotiating the contract to contain the clause down to those
having to perform the clerical work. It also includes those
having to perform budget projections. From the standpoint
of having to negotiate complex, longterm shipbuilding
contracts, it is not, in the author's opinion, advantageous
to either party involved to have overly complex clauses that
can muddle negotiations and lead to adversarial conditions
in the long run. The Navy's experience has been that the
long run results can be very costly as was the case in the
massive shipbuilding claim settlements that occurred in the
late 1970s.
**• Contr act Change Visibility
The author's experience has shown that due to the
complexity of Navy shipbuilding and to the requirement that
weapcn systems be as modern as possible there are numerous
changes to the contract design. The expense involved can be
great and it is important that they be nanaged properly to
best utilize available funding.
From the presentation provided in Chapter III it
follows that under contracts where the 1975 escalation
clause is used changes are priced in bass month dollars as
is the basic contract. The change base> cost and profit are
added to the current contract base cost and profit and are
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provided escalation coverage by means of the escalation
clause. Under contracts containing the 1962 clause,
contract changes were fully forward priced and did not come
under the coverage of the contract escalation clause. This
provided the Navy better visibility of the full cost of
changes and more opportunity for effective management of
same. In the author's opinion not having full visibility
tends to aggrevate the budgeting difficulty of projecting
escalation costs for the initial contract that was discussed
earlier. It is significant to manage changes properly in
order to avoid situations such as the massive shipbuilding
claims that were settled in the late 1970s where the Navy
suffered much criticism from industry and the Congress
concerning contract changes.
5. Windfall Profits
By way of an analysis of the data provided
previously and from information provided in a Comptroller
General Report, [ fief . 8], it was determined that another
effect of the 1975 escalation clause is that there exists
the opportunity for the contractor to earn a profit
windfall. This can happen because escalation costs are not
considered part of the basic contract costs. To elaborate,
escalation costs are not considered in the computation of
the contract target cost, target profit, target price or
ceiling price and are not subject to the contract incentive
pricing provisions. Because of the mechanics of the
escalation computations, escalation costs are subtracted
from actual incurred cost to derive the costs subject to the
incentive provisions. It follows that the more costs the
shipbuilder can incur as escalation costs, the less costs
there will be that are to be considered as base costs and to
be subject to the incentive sharing provisions. Under these
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provisions the situation is such that ths shipbuilder gains
something in profit for cost savings. This situation occurs
when the Navy allows escalation to be paid on costs that are
not effected by inflation. An example of such costs are
fixed subcontracted costs and certain overhead costs such as
depreciation, prepaids, rental costs, leases and taxes.
6 » Profit on Escalation/Unr ecoverable Escalation
There are two remaining aspects of the current
escalation clause that aieri-c discussion. In the author's
opinion they are undesireable in that they increase the
Government's overall cost liability on shipbuilding
contracts while reducing the contractor's risk. It should
be noted that the aspects in question, namely the paying of
profit on escalation and the allowance of unrecoverable
escalation in the contractor's contract pricing are not due
to the mechanics of the 1975 clause as much as they are due
to the approach to escalation coverage that the clause
represents. Even so, a discussion of these issues is
considered appropriate.
Concerning the issue of paying profit on escalation
the author's research indicates that the Navy is currently
considering projected inflationary costs associated with
ship construction contracts in the computation of profit.
The interesting aspect to be considered regarding escalation
coverage is the amount of profit to be allowed has been
viewed from a business perspective as being commensurate
with the amount of risk involved. The current situation
with regard to the Actual Cost Escalation clause is one
where the Government has assumed the majority of the cost




The other issue mentioned above concerns the fact
that some shipbuilders are including in their contract
pricing the expected cost of escalation they feel will not
be recovered through the escalation clause. This is of
course, less than desireable in that tha essence of having
escalation clauses is to eliminate contingency pricing.
This can result in added costs to the Government, especially
in negotiated procurements where competition is not a
significant factor and the target cost is inflated.
D. CESIREABLE ASPECTS
In -he author's opinion the evolution of shipbuilding
contract escalation clauses has produced some desireable
effects. From the shipbuilders standpoint cost risk has
been reduced substantially. As discussed earlier the
current escalation clause in conjunction with the Fixed
Price Incentive contract has provided an arrangement that
fast approaches a Cost Reimbursement type contract. From a
businessman's perspective it would be reasonable to expect
this kind of arrangement would be desireable considering the
length of the contract and the complexity involved.
The current escalation provision is desireable from the
Navy's standpoint primarily because it accomodates all of
the factors that influence -he process and allows needed
ships to be acguired. As noted above it satisfies the
shipbuilders business requirements and it appears to pacify
(money continues to be appropriated) the Congress by not
having to resort to cost type contracts. The clause can
also aid in enhancing the Navy's image with regard to i-s
relations with shipbuilders. The current clause provides
close to actual escalation coverage and the Navy has further
reduced the shipbuilder's cost risk by means of cost like
incentive pricing provisions which means there should be
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less likelihood of shipbuilder's claims. This is most
advantageous to the Navy. Experience has shown that the
claims settlement process can be disruptive to Navy
shipbuilding and extremely expensive. This was borne out by
the experience gained during the recent claim settlements
with major shipbuilders. The author's experience and
research indicate that these proceedings consumed many years
of effort from the people who were otherwise required to be
facilitating new shipbuilding acquisition and administering
ongoing contracts. A review of the settlements by the
authcr shows the costs involved were enormous (S165M for one
major shipbuilder) and involved Public Law 85-804 money
which had to be approved for use by the Congress on the
basis -hat it was required to facilitate the national
defense. It is the author's opinion that it is desireable
to avoid this kind of visibility in that it could convey
mismanagement of public monies with the possibility of
future Navy shipbuilding funding being reduced.
E. SUMMARY
The change from the 1962 clause to the 1975 clause was
significant. The Government assumed more cost risk, some
natural incentivization was compromised and there were
adverse effects including increased complexity. The new
clause aided in making for more cost like contractual




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the paper was to objectively review the
evolution of the current shipbuilding escalation clause with
the intent of drawing some conclusions concerning how and
why the clause developed, the complexity involved, extent of
coverage and its effect. The paper reviewed the types of
shipbuilding contracts and the important factors that
influence them. The purpose, operation and historical
development of escalation coverage was provided. Finally,
the change in the Navy's approach to escalation coverage
from 1962 to 1982 was analyzed.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The current shipbuilding escalation clause is the result
of an evolutionary process that had its beginning during a
time when the Navy was confronted with the reguirement to
obtain ships for a major armed conflict. During the early
histcry of the clause there developed concepts such as
paying escalation based on actual cost computations as well
as paying escalation on a direct pass thru basis. These are
concepts that are in use today in major shipbuilding
programs
.
Eased on the research and analysis of the available data
the author contends that there are some very basic reasons
why the Navy has the kind of escalation clause that is
currently being used. One reason is that the product,
namely modern warships, is inordinately complex and requires
a difficult construction process that most often spans a
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considerable period of time. This construction process is
labor intensive and requires major investment in plant and
equipment. A second reason is that the business entities
that control the major shipbuilding cpapacity in the United
States are very large and posess financial strength. They
also posess ample political influence. These entities have
been willing and able to influence contract provisions by
means of negotiations and by way of the political forum.
The research indicated the involved business entities
desires the most risk free, highest return kind of
contractual arrangement.
A third reason for the current escalation clause is that
the Navy has to do business with the major shipbuilders.
The research indicated that the requirement for modern
warships is pressing both from the standpoint of need and
also from the standpoint of the necessity to spend the
available funding as quickly as possible. If the Navy
cannct agree to terms with major commercial shipbuilders,
there are no alternative means of acquiring ships. The
shipbuilders are cognizant of the situation and are able to
take advantage of the situation to press for desired
contractual provisions. A fourth reason for the current
clause is it enables the Navy to continue to use a fixed
price type cf contract to accomodate buying a product that
might better lend itself to a cost type of contract. Cost
type contracts also tend to be alarming to the public.
The final reason for the current escalation clause, in
the opinion of the author, is the mistaken belief that the
shipbuilder overruns that were incurred during the recent
pericd of spiraling inflation were due solely to the
ineffectiveness of the 1962 clause. There was in fact
spiraling inflation but the operation of the 1962 clause was
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based on a national index that was to a pre-set phasing of
contractor work agreed to at time of contract signing. This
allowed the shipbuilder to recover escalation payments
commensurate with the activity in the economy as long as he
built the ship according to contract schedule.
The clause in the author 1 s opinion has become overly
long and complex which can be dysfunctional from the
standpoint of negotiations and administration. It also
adversely impacts the budgeting process. The complexity has
evolved from the desire to be very specific about the
measurement of escalation coverage. What began as a process
of trying to provide an estimate of escalation costs has
involved into an attempt at an exacting process using more
individual categories of cos~s and' special indices. The
author's research shows that the complexity has been due to
an incremental process that has lent itself to becoming a
situation that is not fully appreciated with regard to the
liability it creates for the Government.
It is the author's opinion that the escalation coverage
provided by the current clause is excessive in that it
provides extensive opportunities for the shipbuilder not to
perform as efficiently as possible from the standpoint of
cost to the Navy. By basing computations on actual incurred
costs, extending coverage until actual delivery and
providing special indices, the shipbuilder is assurred ample
escalation coverage throughout construction and is motivated
to operate in a manner that is most beneficial to the
company. It is the opinion of the author that the current
escalation clause, in conjunction with the Fixed Price
Incentive (FPI) type of contract has created an arrangement
that is very much like a cost type of contract. Kenneth R.
Andrews of the Harvard Business School, [ Ref . 9] notes the
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following concerning contract incentive regarding cost type
contracts:
A manufacturer who plans to perforin services for the
government under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, to cite a
very limited example, feels less need for a fully
developed cost control system and cost related incentives
than one whose contracts are governed by a fixed price.
It is the author's opinion this is the situation with regard
to the use of FPI/Escalaticn contracts in shipbuilding which
provides the opportunity for increased costs to the
Government
.
Regarding the current clause's impact, the author
concludes from the research and analysis the clause is
having seme adverse impact on the shipbuilding process.
This has become evident in the form of delivery,
disincentivizat ion, increased difficulty in budgeting,
increased complexity and administration and the opportunity
for increased profits due to the extent of escalation
coverage and the mechanics of the shareline. While all
these items are of concern the disincentive to deliver is a
serious failing in the curren- clause. Delivery dates are
significant because of Navy operational requirements and
because they are an important aspect of the cost and fee
determination that is agreed zo at contract award.
The Navy has agreed to pay a specified contract price for a
specified delivery and it is dysfunctional to include
escalation provisions that contain delivery
disincentivizat ion.
The comments preceeding this are not an attempt to
discredit shipbuilders as business entities or to imply
their actions are immoral or unethical. The point to be
made is it must be kept in mind that much of their design
and reason for being is to make a profit and it should be
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expected they will make business decisions accordingly. If
contractual arrangements are such that the opportunity
exists for a contractor to enhance its business situation at
the Governments expense and be within the confines of the
mutual agreement (the contract) it should be expected it is
going to happen. The current shipbuilding escalation clause
does provide this kind of opportunity which can have an
adverse impact on the shipbuilding process, effect




It is recommended this analysis be used as a basis for
further study to determine if an alternative to the current
shipbuilding contract escalation clause can be devised. One
alternative would be to eliminate the clause complstely by
resorting to a cost type contractual arrangement. At a
minimum, consideration should be given to the elimination of
the disincentivization to contract delivery and to
performing work from the standpoint of the Government in the
most cost effective way. It is also recommended that
consideration be given to consolidation of the current





GUIDE FOR FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE CONTRACTING
Fundamentals of Incentive Contracts
In essence, nearly all incentives take the form of a
sharing arrangement, generally expressed as a percentage
ratio. For example, if a 60/40 cost sharing formula were
negotiated, the Government would pay 60 cents, and the
contractor 40 cents, of every dollar by which actual costs
increased.
Conversely, for everv dollar saved, the Government would
retain 60 cents, and the'contrac tor' s profit (or fee) would
increase by 40 cents. In other words, over the range of
costs where the sharing arrangement is operative, the
contractor must look at every dollar he spends as though 40
percent of it were his. Profit or fee is thus tuned to the
contractor's control of a variable on which his management
skills can have a significant affect.
Under a cost incentive element the amount of profit the
contractor earns is based on the amount by which his actual
costs exceed or are kept below the target costs. Actual
costs are negotiated on a fixed-price-incentive contract.
Once negotiated final costs are determined, the final profit
or fee is automatically computed in accordance with a
sharing formula already in existence.
The Fixed-Price-Incentive Contract
Dnder the fixed-price-incentive-firm. (FPIF) contract,
the Government and the contractor negotiate the following
elements before award:
[Hi
target cost (against which to measure final costs,
"
~'fi"
.) target prof t ( a reasonable profit for the work at
target cost)
,
(in) ceiling price (the total dollar amount for which the
Government will be liable)
,
(iv) sharing formula (the arrangement for establishing
final profit and price)
.
After the work is completed, the contractor and the
Government negotiate the final costs of the contract,
sharing the overruns or underruns according to the agreed-
upon formula. To illustrate with figures; assume that the
target cost for a contract is $100, the target profit is
$10, the price ceiling is $118, and the sharing formula is
75 percent (Government) and 25 percent (contractor). Under
the formula, the contractor would keep 25 percent of every
dollar saved. To earn a total profit of $12, therefore, he
would have to reduce costs by $8 below target cost. And,
since there is no profit ceiling, profit would continue to
increase indefinitely as the amount of anderrun increased.
Conversely, the contractor would have to overrun the target
cost by $8 to reduce his profit to $8. If he overran by
more than $18, he would lose money, since there is no
minimum profit guaranteed in this con-tract type. Regardless
of the final cost to the contractor, he must meet the
contractual specifications, and the Government's liabilityo
cannct exceed the ceiling price of $118. For this reason,
the FPIF contract should be used in preference to any cost





ARTICLE 8. COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENTS (LABOR AND MATERIAL)
(a) Regardless of the actual changes in the cost of
labor or materials during the performance of this contract,
adjustments in compensation shall be made as provided in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Article. Said adjustments are
based solely on the changes in the Labor Index identified in
paragraDh (b) of the Article and the Material Index
identified in paragraph (c) of this Article. Each
Supplemental Agreement entered into pursuant to this Article
shall set forth the calculations upon which the adjustment
in compensation are made. For the purposes of this Article
33% cf the Target Cost shall be deemed to constitute the
labor cost subject to adjustment and shall be apportioned as
shown in the second column of Table 1 of paragraph (b)
hereof. Similarly, 61% of the Target Cost shall be deemed
to constitute the material cost subject to adjustment and
shall be apportioned as shown in the second column of Table
2 of paragraph (c) hereof. No part of said Tables 1 and 2
shall be revised, unless this contract is partially
terminatsd and then only as provided in subparagraph (f) (2)
of this Article.
8
(b) Adjustments in compensation on account of changes in
labor cost shall be made as follows for each quarterly
period shown in the first column of Table 1 for this
aragraph based on the changes in the Nationwide "Index of
hanges in Straight Time Average Hourly Earning for Selected
Shipyards" (June 1962 = 100) for steel ship construction
herein sometimes called the "Labor Index", furnished to
theNaval Ship Systems Command (Ed. note: Now called Naval
Sea Systems Command) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the United States Department of Labor: (1) The Labor Index
for the base month of April 1972 shall be subtracted from
the Labor Index for the quarterly period involved,
determined in accordance with peragraph (d^" below, and the
difference computed as a plus or minus figure as the case
may te.
(2) The aforesaid difference, whether plus or minus, shall
be divided by the Lavor Index for the base month and the
resulting quotient carried to four decimal daces.
(3) T.ie aforesaid quotient shall be multiplied by the
percentage of the Target Cost set forth in the third column
of Table 1 below, opposite the quarterly period involved,
and the resulting product carried to six decimal places.
(4) The aforesaid product shall be multiplied be $ (Target
Cost). The resulting amount shall constitute the amount of
the adjustment in compensation for tha quarterly period
involved
.
(5) The amount of the adjustment in compensation shall be
upwards or downwards depending upon whether the difference
in the labor indices calculated in subparagraph (1) above is
a plus or minus figure, as the case may be, and shall be set
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% of % of














(c) Adjustments in compensation on account of changes in
material costs shall be made for each quarterly period shown
in the first column of Table 2 below, based on the changes
in the "Material Index for Naval Ship Systems Command Steel
Vessels Contract". herein sometimes called the "Material
Index", furnished to the Naval Ship Systems Command by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department
of Labor:
(1) The Material Index for the base month of April 1972
shall be subtracted from the Material Index for the
quarterly period involved, determined in accordance with
paragraph fd) below, and the difference computed as a plus
or minus figure as the case may be.
(2) The aforesaid difference, whether plus or minus, shall
be divided by the Material Index for the base month and
the resulting quotient carried for four decimal places.
(3) The aforesaid quotient shall be multiplied by the
percen-aqe of the Target Cost set forth in the third
column or Table 2 below, opposite the quarterly period
involved, and the resulting prcduct carried to six decimal
places
.
j(4) The aforesaid product shall be multiplied by $ (Target
Cost). The resulting amount shall constitute the amount
of the adjustment in compensation for the quarterly period
involved.
(5) The amount of the adjustment in compensation shall be
upwards or downwards depending upon whether the difference
in the labor indices calculated in subparagraph (1) above
is a plus or minus figure, as the case may be, and shall
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(d) For the purpose of this Article:
(1) The first quarterly period shall commence on the
first aay of the calendar month following the effective date
of the contract.
f 2) The term, "Target Cost", as referred to herein,
shall be the target cost in effect at the effective date of
this con tr act.
(3) For the purposes of computing the amount of
adjustment in compensation, the amount of Target Cost set
forth in subparagraphs (b) (4) < and (c) (4) shall not be
revised unless this contract is partially terminated and
then only to the extent provided in paragraph (f) (2) of
this Article.
(4) The Labor Index and Material Index for a quarterly
period shall be the arithmetical average carried to one
decimal point of the Labor Index or Material Index, as the
case may be, for each of the three months comprising such
quarterly period.
(e) Nothing contained, in this Article shall be construed
as prohibiting the inclusion of changes in the cost or labor
or material in any adjustment in the target cos*, target
profit, target price, ceiling price, or total final price
provided for under any other provision of this contract!!
(f) (1) If this contract is terminated in whole, for any
reason, no compensation shall be made under this Article for
any quarterly period subsequent to the quarterly period
during which the contract is terminated.
(2) In the event that this contract is terminated in
part, and such partial termination terminates the completion
of one or more vessels, then, notwithstanding any other
provision of this Article. the target cost set forth in
paragraphs (b) and (c) , the percentages of target cost set
forth in paragraph (a), and each column of Table 1 of
paragraph (b) and table 2 of paragraph (c) shall be adjusted
for the reduction in the number of vessels to be completed
under this contract.
(gl Deferred payments for escalation shall be paid
promptly, upon submission of invoices, whenever such
55

payment, when added to the total of all payments previously
made under the contract. would not exceed ninety-five
percent (95*) of the cos.s certified by the Contractor on
such invoice to have been incurred by it in the Derformance
of the contract. Upon delivery of the last vessel under
this contract, any remaining deferred payments for
escalation shall, upon submission of invoices, be promptly
paid. In the event that the amount shown in any
Supplemental Agreement pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c)
above is a minus figure, such amount shall be deducted from




tract until such amount has been offset or recouped in
(h) No adjustment shall be made in the target cost,
target once, or ceiling price on account of upwards or
downwards adjustment in compensation made in accordance with
this Article and hence said adjustments are outside the
incentive price revision formula provided for in Article 8,
"INCENTIVE PRICE REVISION (FIRM TARGET)". Accordingly, even
if the ceiling price is exceeded, amounts otherwise payable
to the Contractor in accordance with this Article shall
continue to be paid.
(i) Any dispute arising under this Article shall be
determined in accordance with orovisions of the "DISPUTES"
clause of the contract.
(j) In the event. tha* the labor or ma terial . indices for
the quarterly period involved have not been furnished to the
NAVSF.A by the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the end of the
ensuing quarter, compensation adjustments for the quarterly
period involved shall be made based upon the average of the
changes in the indices for the preceding four quarters for
which indices have been computed and furnished by the BLS.
The average of changes so calculated shall be added to the
applicable index for the immediately preceding quarterly
period and the sum shall constitute the labor or material
index for the quarterly period involved. When an index for
the quarterly period involved is computed and furnished by
BLS, the Contractor shall reflect any required corrections
for the quarterly period involved m the submittal for




SAMPLE OF COMPUTATION OF LABOR ESCALATION UNDER 1962 CLAUSE
1. Heflected below is a sample computation of the labor
escalation adjustment for the 5th quarterly period under a
contract containing the 1962 clause. The sample assumes:
a. The date on which the contract was signed is December
1962.
b. The labor percentage specified in paragraph (a) of the
article is 29%.
c. The base month for labor is September 1962.
d. The contract target cost stated in the clause is$31,972,000.
e. The labor escalation table specified is as follows:
Percent of contract
cost subject to ad-justment for changes
Percent of labor cost in labor cost appor-
















f. The labor indices furnished by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for the three months comprising the 6th





2. Difference between 6th Quarter Labor and Contract Base
Month Index.























Increase in 6th Quarter Index over Contract Base Month
Index of September 1962.
Average for 6th Quarter 102.2




3. Percentage Increase in Labor Index.
1.3 Difference / 100.9 Base Month = .0-12884
Rounded off four decimal places = .0129
4. Percentage Increase in Labor Index for the 6th Quarter.
Labor Percentage Increase .0129
6th Quarter Allocation x .026
6th Quar-er Increase .0003354
Rounded off six decimal places .000335
5. Dcllar Adjustment in Contract Target Cost for Labor Increase
in the 6th Quarter.
Contract Target Cost $31,972,000







The contract price agreed to by the parties reflects the
labor and material price levels of the base month identified
in paragraph (d) below. It is anticipated that the
Contractor's actual costs for labor and material may change
from the labor and material costs projected on the basis of
such price levels and the parties desire to provide for
adjustment to the compensation to reflect such changes.
However, regardless of the actual changes in the costs of
labor and material experienced during the period of
performance, compensation adjustments shall be computed and
effected solely on the basis of monthly changes in the Labor
and Material indices identified below, in accordance with
the procedures specified herein.
(b) Monthly Period
Except as hereinafter provided in paragraph (el ,
adjustments in compensation snail be made for each monthly
oericd following the effective date of this contract until
delivery of the last vessel to be delivered under the
contract. For the purpose of this Article, a "monthly
period" or "monthly period involved" shall beqin on the
first day of a calendar month and shall end at the end of
the last day of that calendar month; except that" monthly
period" shall include the calendar months of the effective
date of this contract and the delivery date of the last
vessel to be delivered under the contract, respectively.
(c) Costs Subject to Compensation Adjustment
(1) For the purpose of this Article, the elements of
cost which will comprise the monthly costs of the contract
subject to adjustment are (i)_ direct material costs, (ii)
direct labor costs, and (iii) 75 % of indirect costs; the
remaining 25% of indirect costs are not subject to
adjustment. The costs subject to compensation adjustment
under this Article include the costs of performance of
change orders or other work for which the contract price is
subject to adjustment pursuant to the "Changes" clause or
pursuant to other provisions of the contract. Accordingly,
all such contract price adjustments shall be priced on the
basis of the labor and material price levels of the base
month identified in paragraph (d) below. For the purpose of
this contract. the terms "direct material costs", and
"indirect costs" shall have the meanings and shall be
allowable in accordance with Section XV or the Armed Forces
Procurement Regulations in effect on the date of this
contract
.
(2) Within 15 days following the end of each monthly
period, the Contractor shall submit to the Government (i) a
certified statement of the costs incurred by vessel, for
each vessel under the contract during that monthly period
("monthly costs") and (ii) a certified statement of the
total cumulative costs incurred for all vessels under the
contract from the effective date of the contract to the end
of that monthly period ("total costs") . The statement of
monthly costs shall separately identify the direct material
costs, the direct labor costs, and the indirect costs
incurred during that monthly period for each vessel.
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(3) For the purpose of this Article, monthly costs and
total costs are costs which are "incurred costs" as that
term is defined in paragraph
(a) (iii) of Article 4 , "Payments", except that:
(i) incurred costs for material shall also include the
full amounts of all billings received from vendors during
the monthly period involved, whether or not the Contractor
has paid the full amount of such billings.
(ii) incurred costs shall exclude the amounts determined
in accordance with the contract provisions identified in
paragraph (a) j(1) (ii) of Article 6, "INCENTIVE Price
Revision" of this contract (ED. note: any items fully
forward priced and separately accounted for)
.
(4) The costs identified in the preceding
subparagraphs shall be subject to Government verification
upcn submission by the Contractor of the ceritified
statements of such costs.
(d) Labor and Material Indices
(1) Adjustments in compensation on account of changes indirect material costs shall be based on the changes in the
"Index for Steel Vessel Contracts", (1957 = 100) (herein
sometimes called the "Material Index") furnished to the
Naval Sea Systems Command by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
of the Department of Labor(BLS) . For the purpose of this
contract, the base month for the Material Index shall be May
1974.
(2) Adjustments in compensation of account of changes in
direct labor costs and on account of 75* of indirect costs
shall be based on the changes in the "Indexes of Change in
Straight-Time Average Hourly Earnings for Selected Shipyards
for Steel Vessel Construction and All Regions" (Jane 1962
= 100) (herein sometimes called the "Labor Index), furnished
to the Naval Sea Systems Command by ths Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the Department of Labor (BLS)
.
For the
purpose of this contract, the base month for the Labor Index
shall be May 1974.
(3) In the event that the Labor or Material Index, orboth, for the monthly period involved is unavailable to the
Contractor at the end of that monthly period, compensation
adjustments pursuant to this Article shall be based upon the
average of monthly changes in the applicable Index for the
previous 3 months for which BLS indices are available. The
average of changes so calculated shall be added to the
applicable index for the immediately preceding monthly
period and the sum shall constitute the Labor or Material
Index for the monthly period involved. When the BLS Index
for that monthly period has been mads available, the
compensation adjustment for that monthly period shall be
recomputed on the basis of such BLS Index, and any
additional payment to or repayment bv the Contractor
required by such recomputation for that monthly period shall
be reflected in any invoice (s) thereafter submitted for
payment under any provision of this contract until such
amount has been paid, offset or recouped in full.
t
or
(4) in the event that the Final Labor or Material Index
or bcth f for any monthly period differs from the LaborMateria^ Index previously made available by BLS for that
monthly period, the compensation adjustment for the Monthly
period shall be recomputed on the basis of such Final Index
and any additional payment to or repayment bv the Contractor
required by such recomputation for that monthly period shall
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be reflected in any inyoice (s) submitted thereafter for
payment under any provision of this contract until such
amount has been paid, offset or recouped in full.
(5) The Contractor shall, be responsible for the
claculations involving the Indices provided for m this
paragraph and said calculations shall be subject to
verification by the Government.
(e) Computation
on
(1) The direct material costs for each vessel certified
.he statement of monthly costs shall be multiplied by the
base month Material Index and the product thereof shall be
divided by the Material Index for that monthly period,
provided however, that in respect of any monthly period
commencing after the delivery date then set forth in Section
H for such vessel to be delivered under the contract, the
above product shall be divided by the Material Index for the
monthly period of the aforesaid contract delivery date or by
the Material Index for that monthly period, whichever is the
lesser; provided, further, that in the event thereafter such
contract delivery date is extended for reasons of Government
responsibility or excusable delay, the compensation
adjustment for each month of such extention shall be
recomputed on the basis of the Material Index for such
month. The result of each computation for each vessel shall
be expressed in dollars and cents.
(2) The direct labor costs plus 75? of the indirect
costs certified on the statement of monthly costs for each
vessel shall be multiplied by the base month Labor Index,
and the product thereof shall be divided by the Labor Index
for that monthly period commencing after the delivery date
then set forth in Section H for such vessel to be delivered
under the contract, the above product shall be divided by
the Labor Index for the monthly period of the aforesaid
contract delovery date or by the Labor Index for that
monthly period, whichever is the lesser; provided, further,
that in the event thereafter such contract delivery date is
extended for reasons of Government responsibility or
excusable delay, the compensation adjustment for each month
of such extention shall oe recomputed on the basis of the
Labor Index for such month. The'result of each computation
for each vessel shall be expressed in dollars and cents .
(3) The amounts of the results of (1) and (2) above, for
each vessel, and the amount of the 25? of indirect costs for
each vessel certified on the monthly statement which are not
subject to adjustment shall be added, and the sum shall
constitute the "Base Cost" for such vessel for that monthly
period.
(4) The Base Cost for each vessel for the monthly period
involved shall be subtracted from the monthly costs of such
vessel and the resulting difference (plus or minus) shall
constitute the amount of the adjustment in compensation for
the monthly period involved for each vessel. provided,
however, that no adjustment in compensation shall be made in
the event that the cumulative sum of the Base Costs of all
vessels for all preceding months exceeds the Ceiling Price
then set forth in the contract; provided, further, that in
the event the Ceiling Price thereafter is increased.
adjustment in compensation shall be made for each month tha*:
the cumulative sum of the Base Costs of all months preceding
such month does not exceed such increased Ceiling Price.
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(5) The amount of the adjustment in compensation for
each vessel determined as above, (plus or minus) , shall be
set forth in a Supplemental Aareement to this contract,
which also shall set forth the computations upon which the
adjustment in compensation is based.
(6) In the event that the amount shown in any
Supplemental Agreement pursuant to subparagraph (e) (5)
above is a minus figure, such amount shall be deducted from
any invoice(s) presented for payment under any provision of
this contract until such amount has been offset or recouped
in full.
(f) Payment of Compensation Adjustment
Payments of amounts of compensation adjustment under
this Article shall be made monthly, after submission and
verification of the information and calculations required by
the paragraphs (c)
,
(d) , and (e) above, and after execution
of the Supplemental Agreement oursuant to subparagraph (e)
(5) above, and upon submission of proper invoices by the
Contractor, subject to any adjustments pursuant to
subparagraphs (d) (2), (d) (3), and (e) (5), as applicable;
provided, that any such payment shall be deferred to the
extent of the amount that such payment, when added to the
ly made
: to pa rag raj.
of Article 4, "Payments") would exceed the amount of the
total of all payments previous under the contract
(other t han payments made pursuant phs (b) and (d)
total costs. Payment of such deferred amount shall be made
promptly, upon submission of proper invoices by the
Contractor, whenever such amount, or portion of such amount,
when added to the total of all payments made under the
contract (ether than payments made pursuant to paragraphs
(b) and (a) of Article 4, "Payments") would not exceed the
amount or total costs. Upon delivery of the last vessel
under this contract, any remaining deferred payments for
compensation adjustments shall, upon submission of proper
invoices by the Contractor and verification thereof by the
Contracting Officer, be promptly paid.
(g) Inspection of Records
The Contractor shall maintain and make available for
inspection by the Contracting Officer or his duly authorized
representatives, in addition to such books, records. and
papers otherwise required under this contract to be
maintained and made available to the Government for
examination, such books, records, and papers as may be
necessary (i) for the verification of the costs certified by
the Contractor have been incurred, and (ii) for the
evaluation and substantiation of any compensation adjustment
requested under the provisions of this Article. Errors in
the statements of costs incurred and/or in the computation
of compensation adjustments shall be corrected promptly, and
such correction shall be reflected in the next invoice
submitted after such correction. (Failure of the Contractor
to cemply with any provision of this paragraph (g) shall
constitute proper grounds for the witholding of any and all
payments under any provision of the contract until such time
as the Contractor fullv complies with all provisions of this
paragraph to the satisfaction of the Contracting Officer.)
(h) Disputes
Any dispute arising under this clause shall be
determined in accordance with provisions of the "Disputes"










BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics




Escalation payments are computed by the following
formula:
Monthly Esc. (LMO) = Actual Monthly Costs - Base Costs
where.
and,
Monthly Costs = A B C
A = Material Cost; full actual
costs , including any contractor
withholding from vendors
B Labor Costs: Actual paid direct
labor costs
C = Indirect Costs
Ease Costs = (D) (A) (E) (B) + (E) (P) (C)
J1-P) (C)
D = BLSI(b) / BLSI(c) (for material)
E = BLSI(b) / BLSI(c) (for labor)
P = a fraction defined in the con-
tract ; (P = 90* is commonly used)
Ex a mcle*
Let actual monthly costs be:
A = Actual Monthly
Material Costs = $ 500,000
B = Actual Monthly
Labor Costs = $1,000,000
C = Actual Indirect
Costs = $ 900,000
A B C = Actual Monthly
Costs = $2,400,000
Snd Base Costs be determined by:
BLSI(M) Base Period 110
D = = = 0.0901
BLSI(M) Current Period 100
BLSI(L) Base Period 100
E = = = 0.8333
BLSI(L) CurrentPeriod 120
P =90*
(1 - P) = 10*

Then escalation recovery is givsn by:
Monthly Esc. = (A + 3+C) - [ (D) (A) +
0) " +
-
(9Q*C(.833) (81 0, 00v







SSN 688 CLASS CLAUSE (CURRENT)
COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENTS (LABOR AND MATERIAL)
(a) General
(H The contract prices agreed to by the parties reflect
the price levels of the base periods identified in paragraph
(d) below. It is anticipated that the contractor's actual
costs may vary from the price levels of the base periods and
the parties desire to provide for adjustment to compensation
to reflect such variations. However, regardless of the
actual variations in the costs experienced during the period
of performance, adjustments in compensation because of such
variations shall be computed and effected in accordance with
the procedures specified herein.
(2) Except as hereinafter provided in paragraph (e) (3).
adjustments In compensation shall be made in respect of each
individual vessel for each monthly period commencing January
1980 and ending with the monthly period in which the actual
delivery of the last vessel to be delivered under the
contract occurs or the monthly period in which the "Post
Delivery Dat€ H (see paragraph (a) (3) below) of the last
vessel occurs, whichever is later. For the purpose of this
clause, a "monthly period" or "monthly period involved"
shall mean the contractor's normal accounting month.
(3) The "Post Delivery Date" for the purpose of this
clause is defined as a date eight (8) months after the
contract delivery date of the applicable vessel set forth in
Section H, "Deliveries or Performance".
(b) Fricing of Changes
(1) The costs subject to adjustment under this clause
include the costs of performance of changes or other work
for which the contract price is subject to equitable
adjustment pursuant to the "Changes" clause or pursuant to
other provisions of the contract. Accordinglv, equitable
adjustments to the contract price shall be determined on the
basis of actual and/or projected direct material costs,
direct labor costs and indirect costs de-escalated to price
levels of the base periods identified in peragraph (d)
below. The method of de-escalation shall be the same as
that set forth in paragraph (e) for determining compensation
adjustments and base costs.
(2) In the event and to the extent that work authorized
under the "Changes" clause results or will result in costs
being incurred with respect to a vessel after the monthly
pericd commencing subsequent to the Post Delivery Date of
such vessel (or, in the case of the last vessel to be
delivered, the monthly period commencing subsequent to the
actual delivery date if such date occurs after the Post
Delivery Date), the equitable adjustment for such change
shall take account of such costs at their estimated actual
value (s) rather than at the base period value (s) provided
for in paragraph (b) (1) above. The costs included in the
aforementioned equitable ad justment( s) shall be adjusted to
preclude payment of any costs reimbursed under this clause.
(c) Cost Subject to Compensation Adjustment
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(1) For the purpose of this clause, the total allowable
costs in the following categories shall be subject to
monthly compensation adjustment:
Selected employee benefits
",nair< "FICA (i direct costs)




4 Disability (indirect costs)
Federally Mandated National Health Progr;
indirect costs)
6 Federally Mandated changes to hours of work
per week or per day and changes to the pay-
ment of overtime (indirect and direct costs)
b Selected energy costs (indirect costs)
1 Electricity
2 Fuel oils
(i\ Bunker C (No. 6)
fii) Diesel 260 (No. 2 by gallon and drum)
3 Coke
4 Coal
c One hundred percent of the imputed cost of
facilities capital (indirect costs)
d Ninety-five percent of indirect costs other than
indirect costs in (c) (1) a, b. and c above
e One hundred percent ot direct labor costs
f One hundred percent of direct material costs
(2) Within 30 days after the end of each monthly period
with respect to each individual vessel, the contractor shall
submit to the Government: (i) a certified statement of the
costs incurred for that vessel during that monthly period
(monthly costs) and (ii) a certified statement of the total
cumulative costs incurred for that vessel from the effective
date of the contract to the end of that monthly period
(total costs). The statement of monthly costs shall
seoarately identify the direct material costs. the direct
labor costs and the indirect costs. With respect to
indirect costs, the statement of monthly costs shall state
separately from all other indirect costs (i) the monthly
incurred selected employee benefit costs of the type
identified in paragraph (c)(1) a above, (ii) the monthly
incurred selected energy costs of the type identified in
paragraph (c) (1)b above, (iii) the monthlyimputed cost of
facilities capital allocated to the vessel involved, and
(iv) the ninety-five percent of indirect costs subject to
compensation adjustments
a The monthly selected employee benefit costs for the
vessel involved shall be the product obtained by multiplying
the yard-wide total selected employee benefit costs of the
type identified in paragraph (c) (1)a above by the amount of
total overhead dollars, excluding the imputed cost of
facilities capital, allocated to each vessel for the monthly
period involved ana the product shall be divided by yard-
wide total overhead dollars, exlcuding the imputed cost of
facilities capital, for the monthly period involved. b The
monthly incurred selected energy costs for the vessel
involved shall be the product obtained by multiplying the
yard-wide total selected energy costs of the type identifiedm paragraph (c) (1)b above by the amount of general overhead
dollars, excluding the imputed cost of facilities capital,
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allocated to each vessel for the monthly period involved and
the product shall be divided by the total yard-wide general
overhead dollars, excluding tha imputed cost of facilities,
for the monthly period involved.
(3) For the prupose of this clause:
fa) "Direct material costs", "direct labor costs", and
"indirect costs" shall have the meaning set forth m Section
XV of the Defense Acquisition Regulation in effect on the
effective date of this contract.
t "Monthly costs" and "total costs" shall include only
"incurred costs" and "allowable costs" as those terms are
defined in paragraph (a) (iii) of tha clause entitled
"Payments" except that "incurred costs" for material shall
include the full amounts of all billings received from
vendors during the monthly period involved irrespective of
whether the contractor has paid the full amount of such
billings. Further, on this contract, the imputed cost of
facilities capital shall be treated as an "incurred indirect
cost".
(4) The costs identified in this paragraph (c) shall be
subject to audit and inspection by the Contracting Officer
in accordance with the previsions set forth in paragraph (h)
of the clause entitled "Payments".
(d) Cost Indices
(1) Selected employee .benef its compensation adjustments
shall be based on changes in the monthly average hourly cost
of these benefits. For the month involved, the average
hourly cost of the benefits listed in (c) (1)a above shall be
determined by dividing the total costs recorded (including
adjustments made at the end of the accounting year and
included in the calculations for the month of December) in
the contractor's accounts for the items listed in (c)(1) a
above by the total of direct and indirect labor hours
charged to all product lines and to plant under construction
accounts and the result shall be carried to the same number
of decimal places as the index value for the base period as
shown in paragraph (d) (3) below.
(2) Selected energy costs condensation adjustments shall
be based on the following:
a Electricity and fuel oil compensation adjustments
shall be based on changes in the average monthly unit values
of those costs. Monthly unit values for electricity costs
and fuel oil costs listed in (c) (1)b above shall be computed
by dividing the total usage amount of each such energy cost
element during that monthly period for the contractor's
entire yard into the total purchase cost billed to the
contractor for the total usage amount of each such energy
cost element and the result shall be carried to the same
number of decimal places as the index values for the base
periods as shewn in paragraph (d) (8) below. Average monthly
unit values are the indices for computing electricity and
fuel oil compensation adjustments under paragraph (e) below.
(b) Coke and coal compensation adjustments under
paragraph (e) below shall be based on changes in the
following wholesale price indices published monthly by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS): Coke shall be based on







c above; and direct labor costs shall be based on changes in
the "Indices of Change in Straight-rime Average Hourly
Earnings for Selected Shipyards for Steel Vessel
Construction and All Regions" {September 1980 = 100) (herein
sometimes called the "Labor Index") furnished to the Naval
Sea Systems Command by the BLS.
(4) compensation under paragraphAdjustments in L_
below for direct material costs shall be based On the
changes in the "Index for Steel Vessel Contracts"
100)
' (herein sometimes called the "Material
furnished to the Naval Sea Syste is Command by the BLS
(1967 =
Index")
(5) In the event that any of the specified indices for
the monthly period involved are unavailable to the
contractor at the close of that monthly period- compensation
adjustments pursuant to this clause shall be based upon the
average of monthly changes in the applicable indices for the
previous four (4) months for which indices are available .
The average of changes so calculated shall be added to the
applicable index for the immediately preceding monthly
period and the sum shall constitutue the index for the
monthly period involved. When the applicable index for the
monthly period involved has been made available, the
compensation adjustment for that monthly period shall be
recomputed on the basis of such index, and any additional
by the contractor reguired by such
" ect:ed in
payment to or repayment
recomput ation for that monthly period shall be refl
any invoice(s) thereafter submitted for payment under any
provision of this contract until such amount has been paid,
offset or recouped in full.
(6) In the event that anv of the specified indices for
any base period or any monthly period differs from the index
previously available for that period, the compensation
adjustment for the applicalble monthly period (s) shall be
recomputed on the basis of such revised index and any
additional payment to or repayment by the contractor
reguired by such recomput ation for that monthlv period (s)
shall be reflected in any invoice(s) submitted' thereafter
for payment under any provision of this contract until such
amount has been paid, offset or recouped in full.
(7) The contractor shall be responsible for the
calculations involving the indices provided for in this
paragraph, and said calculations shall be subject to
verification by the Government.
(8) For the purpose of computing compensation
adjustments under this clause. the' following are the
applicable base period index values (subject to adjustment
as specified in paragraph (d) (6) above) :
Description
Selected employee benefits costs
Selected energy costs:
Elect ricity
Bunker C (No. 6)
Diesel 260 (No. 2)



























Coal Sep 1980 472.1
Cost of facilities capital:
95* of indirect costs other than
indirect costs in (c)(1)a,b, and
.»„„ -„„ „
c above; and direct labor cost Sep 1990 100.0
Direct material cost Sep 1980 275.9
* Index value for selected employee benefit costs is deter-
mined by dividing the base year total selected employee
benefit costs by the base year total labor hours (direct
and indirect) charged to all product lines and to Plant
Under Construction accounts.
(e) Computation of Compensation Adjustment and Base Cost
(1) For the purpose of computing compensation
adjustments under this clause. the following computations
shall be used for all the categories of cost specified in
paragraph (c) (1) .
a For each monthly period commencing Drior to the Post
Delivery Date of a vessel, the amount of the applicable
category of cost for such vessel certified on the statement
of monthly costs for that monthly period shall be multiplied
by the difference between the value of the applicable index
Current Base Current
Month — Period X Month
Index Index Cost = Compensation
Current Month Index Adjustment
b For each monthly Deriod commencing (i) subsequent to
the Post Delivery Date" of a vessel and (ii) prior to the
§ost or actual delivery date of the last vessel to be
elivered under the contract (whichever date is later), the
value of the applicable index for the monthly period of the
Post Delivery Date of the vessel involved or the value of
the applicalble index for the monthly period involved,
whichever value is the lesser, shall be the value used in
the computation in (e) (1)a above as the Current Month Index
to calculate the compensation adjustment.
c In the event and to the extent that the contract
delivery date for a vessel is subsequently extended for
reascns of governmnet responsibility or excusable delay, the
Post Delivery Date for such vessel shall be deemed to be
extended on a day-for-day basis and if. as a result, the
Post Delivery Date is extended beyond the monthly period (s)
involved shall be recomputed on the basis of the value of
the applicable index for the monthly period (s) involved.
d For any monthly period commencing subsequent to the
post or actual delivery date of the last vessel to be
delivered under the contract, whichever date is the later,
there shall be no compensation adjustment.
(2\ For the purpose of computing Base Cost, the
following shall aoply:
a For each monthly period commencing prior to the post or
actual delivery date of the last vessel to be delivered
under the contract, whichever date is later. the
compensation adjustments computed under (e) (1) above for all
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categories of cost for each vessel shall be totaled and
subtracted from Total Monthly Cost for such vessel for that
monthly period.
(3) No adjustment in compensation under this clause
shall be made for any monthly period for any vessel in the
event that the cumulative sum of the Base Costs for all
vessels for all preceding monthly periods exceeds the
Ceiling Price then set forth in this contract: provided,
further, that in the event the Ceiling Price thereafter is
increased, by modification to this contract, adjustment in
compensation under this clause shall be made for each
monthly period that the cumulative sum of the Base Costs for
all vessels for all preceding monthly periods does not
exceed such increased Ceiling Price.
(4) The amount of •'the adjustment in compensation for
each individual vessel determined as above (plus or minus)
shall be set forth separatelv in a Supplemental Agreement to
this contract, which also shall set forth the computation
upon which each adjustment in compensation is based.
(5) In the event that any amount shown in anv
Supplemental Agreement pursuant to subparagraph (e) (4) in
respect to a vessel is a minus figure, such amount shall be
deducted from any invoice (s) presented for payment under any
provision of this contract until such amount has been offset
or recouped in full.
(f) Payment of Compensation Adjustment, Payments of
amounts of compensation adjustment under this clause shall
be made for each vessel on the basis of monthly periods.
Except as provided in subparagraph (f) (3) below,
compensation adjustment payments shall be made provisionally
on a biweekly basis as set forth in (f) (2) below and then
adjusted on a monthly basis as set forth in (f)(1) below.
For the purpose of this paragraph (f) : a weekly period is
the contractor's normal accounting week., and a "biweekly
period is two consecutive weekly periods.
(1) After execution of the Supplemental Agreement
Pursuant to subparagraph (e) (4) , of this clause in respect
of a monthly period, and upon submission of proper invoices,
the contractor shall be paid or there shall be deducted for
each vessel the amount set forth in such Supplemental
Agreement, less the sum of the amounts of the provisional
compensation adjustments paid or payable on account of such
vessel pursuant to (f^ (2) below for biweekly periods, or any
weeks of biweekly periods, falling in the monthly period to
which the Supplemental Agreement applies. Each Supplemental
Agreement shall set forth a biweekly Drovisional
compensation adjustment amount for each vessel for the
purpose of making provisional compensation adjustment
payments pursuant to subparagraph (f) (2J below for Biweekly
periods ending after execution of such Supplemental
Agreement until the next Supplemental Agreement is executed.
The biweekly provisional compensation adjustment amount for
each vessel shall be determined by dividing the amount of
the compensation adjustment for the monthly period involved
set forth in the Supplemental Agreement for each vessel by
the number of weekly periods in the monthly period to which
the Supplemental Agreement applies. The quotient shall then
be multiplied by two and the product shall be the biweekly
provisional compensation adjustment amount.
nr\

(2) At the end of every biweekly period, upon submission
of proper invoices, the contractor shall be paid on account
of each vessel the biweekly provisional compensation
adjustment set forth in the most recently executed
Supplemental Agreement.
(3) Any payment under (f) (1) or (f) (2) above shall bedeferred to the extent that the amount or such payment, when
added to the total of all payments previously paid or
payable with respect to such vessel under this clause and
the "Payments" clause (other than payments made pursuant to
paragraph (g) of the "Payments" clause), would exceed the
total cost limitations which are then applicable to that
vessel under the terms of paragraphs (a) (1), (2), (3). and
(4) of the "Payments" clause. Deferred payments of
compensation adjustments shall be paid upon submission of
subseguent invoices, certified by the contractor on the
related invoice to nave been incurred by it in performance
of wcrk on such vessel, whenever such payment, when added to
the total of all payments previously" male with respect to
such vessel under this clause and the "Payments" clause
(other than payments made pursuant to paragraph (g) of the
"Payments" clause) would not exceed the* total cost
limitations which are then applicable to that vessel under
the terms of paragraphs (a) (1), (2), (3) , and (4) of the
"Payments" clause of the allowable cost (as that term is
defined in this clause) . After the close of the monthly
period during which the last delivered vessel is actually
delivered. remaining deferred payments for condensation
adjustment shall, upon submission of proper invoices by the
contractor and upon verification thereof by the Contracting
Officer, be promptly paid.
(4) The Government agrees that any request for approval
to make progress payments more frequently than once every
two weeks will include a request for similar approval of
more frequent compensation adjustment payments. Upon
approval by cognizant Government authority, this Drovision
will be modified accordingly without additional
consideration by the Contractor to the Government for such
modifications.
(g) Separate Reimbursement. No adjustment shall be made
in the Target Cost, Target Profit, Target Price or Ceiling
Price on account of upwards or downwards adjustments in
compensation made in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
clause, and hence said adjustments will be paid separately
and are outside the incentive price revision formula
provided for in the clause hereof entitled "Incentive Price
revision (Firm Target)".
(h) Disputes. Any dispute arising under this clause
shall be determined in accordance with and subject to the
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